Agency in Organization and Teams

Much of the research on physician agency focuses on individual decision-making, holding organizational context fixed. In practice, however, physicians rarely operate in isolation. Treatment decisions are shaped by referral networks, team-based care, and organizational constraints imposed by hospitals, physician groups, and integrated delivery systems. Today, we study how physician agency operates when decision-making authority is shared across multiple providers and embedded within organizations.

Referral networks and team structure play an important role in shaping care delivery. Patterns of interaction among physicians influence treatment intensity, coordination, and patient outcomes, even when financial incentives are held constant. Empirical studies show that referral relationships affect both where patients receive care and which treatments they receive, with implications for performance and equity in healthcare delivery (Zeltzer (2020); Agha et al. (2022)).

Physicians also exercise agency by influencing where patients receive care, including hospital choice and downstream referrals. In settings where patients rely on physician expertise to navigate complex provider choice sets, physician preferences and constraints can meaningfully affect hospital utilization. Evidence from institutional reforms that alter physician choice sets illustrates how agency interacts with market structure (Gaynor, Propper, and Seiler (2016)).

Finally, agency is especially salient in settings where care is transferred or delegated across providers or facilities. These environments highlight how organizational rules and institutional incentives shape physician decision-making under tight constraints. Evidence from long-term acute care hospitals and emergency departments shows how agency affects utilization and patient outcomes in institutional settings (Eliason et al. (2018); Gruber, Hoe, and Stoye (2023)).

Taken together, these papers show that physician agency cannot be understood solely at the individual level. Organizational structure and team-based decision-making are central to how care is delivered and how policy interventions ultimately operate. Potential papers for presentation today include:

References

Agha, Leila, Keith Marzilli Ericson, Kimberley H. Geissler, and James B. Rebitzer. 2022. “Team Relationships and Performance: Evidence from Healthcare Referral Networks.” Management Science 68 (5): 3735–54. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4091.
Eliason, Paul J., Paul L. E. Grieco, Ryan C. McDevitt, and James W. Roberts. 2018. “Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals.” American Economic Review 108 (11): 3232–65. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170092.
Gaynor, Martin, Carol Propper, and Stephan Seiler. 2016. “Free to Choose? Reform, Choice, and Consideration Sets in the English National Health Service.” American Economic Review 106 (11): 3521–57. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20121532.
Gruber, Jonathan, Thomas P. Hoe, and George Stoye. 2023. “Saving Lives by Tying Hands: The Unexpected Effects of Constraining Health Care Providers.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 105 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01044.
Zeltzer, Dan. 2020. “Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12 (2): 169–97. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180201.